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data and controlling for other possible influences, we then evaluate the effects on measured 
efficiency from the divestitures that many of the utilities underwent during the study period. We 
find that while all divestitures as a group do not significantly affect distribution efficiency, those 
mandated by state public utility commissions have resulted in large and statistically significant 
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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past fifteen years a vast restructuring of the electric power sectors in the U.S. 
and many other countries has taken place.  In the U.S. one of the key components of 
restructuring has been the divestiture of generation assets from distribution and transmission 
companies.  Also important have been the divestiture of control (but not ownership) of 
transmission assets to independent system operators and regional transmission organizations, and 
in some states the further divestiture of marketing/supply from the infrastructure wires business 
of traditional distribution companies.  The divestiture of generation facilities was intended, along 
with entry, to help create a standalone generation sector that would compete for the business of 
downstream marketers and distributors of power to final customers.  The shifting of control of 
transmission assets to independent system operators (ISOs) and regional transmission 
organizations (RTOs) was designed to prevent discriminatory use of the grid and also to facilitate 
more efficient operation of the transmission grid.  The purpose of separating marketing from 
wires was to spur entry of and competition among the marketers, leaving only the wires business 
for continued regulation as a natural monopoly. 
 The common thread running through these and other reforms in the electricity sector has 
been the effort to inject competition wherever possible, with the expectation that stronger 
competition would result in lower overall costs of producing and delivering power and ultimately 
lower prices to consumers.  Evidence has now begun to address whether these expectations have 
been met.  At the sectoral level, a few studies find evidence of improvements in the operating 
efficiency of the post-divestiture generation sector.  Notably, studies by Bushnell and Wolfram 
(2005) and by Fabrizio et al (2007) report an increase in several measures of fuel and/or non-fuel 
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 efficiency of power plants after divestiture. 
 These latter studies are important in that they suggest the very real possibility of 
efficiency improvements from divestiture in the generation sector.  But divestiture actually 
created two standalone industries–distribution as well as generation1.  There appears to have 
been no commonly held or understood hypotheses concerning the effects of restructuring on 
distribution, nor have there been any studies of the effects of divestiture policy on the 
distribution sector.  This omission is notable for two reasons.  First, the distribution sector 
represents fully 35 percent of the value added in the industry, so any effect of divestiture on 
distribution is likely to be quantitatively significant.  Second, the overall assessment of 
divestiture policy must consider its effects not only on generation, but also on the simultaneously 
created standalone distribution sector.  Indeed, a sufficient decline in distribution efficiency 
might even outweigh gains to generation and result in an adverse judgment about divestiture 
policy overall. 
 This study examines the effects of divestiture policy on the operating efficiency of 
distribution utilities.  We focus on the decisive 1994-2003 period when state utility commissions 
required or pressured utilities to create standalone generation facilities, and thereby almost 
incidentally standalone distribution systems.  We examine major divestitures both in general and 
also with particular respect to those that were forced upon utilities by state public utility 
commissions or legislative action.  The possibility of an adverse effect from divestiture policy is 
                                                 
1 Attempts by FERC to create a separate transmission sector, made up of Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs) have been only partly successful.  
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 most obvious in these latter cases which were least likely to correspond to utilities’ perceived self-
interest. 
  The analytical foundation of this study is the measurement of the operating efficiency of 
73 distribution units of major U.S. electric utilities in each of those ten years through the use of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA).  DEA generates a numerical score for each distribution utility 
in each year, a score that represents its efficiency of input use relative to best practice in that year.  
Using this panel of data and controlling for other possible influences, we then evaluate the effects 
on measured efficiency from the divestitures that many of the utilities underwent during the study 
period.  We find that while all divestitures as a group do not significantly affect distribution 
efficiency, those mandated by state public utility commissions have resulted in large and 
statistically significant adverse effects on efficiency. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides some further background on 
these industry changes and on the literature that has previously examined them.  Section III 
discusses the data and modeling..  Results and implications are set out in Section IV, while 
Section V concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE INDUSTRY AND ISSUES 
 Divestitures in the electricity sector were the logical outgrowth of the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992, which sought to promote wholesale market competition through a policy of open access 
to transmission lines owned by large vertically integrated utilities.  Those utilities often impeded 
transactions between buyers and independent or outside sellers who needed transmission services.  
In response, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in 1996 issued an order requiring so-
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 called “functional separation” of integrated utilities’ operations, with separate administrative units 
for generation and transmission, and with separately priced transmission services. 
 Functional separation was intended to achieve the objective of open access in the least 
intrusive manner, but in practice it failed to prevent vertically integrated utilities from exploiting 
their ownership and control of the transmission grid.  This prompted a further FERC order in 
1999 that sought to remove control of transmission from vertically integrated utilities by 
transferring grid operating decisions to ISOs and RTOs.  These latter institutions were charged 
with running the transmission grid on a nondiscriminatory basis, as well as performing a number 
of other tasks normally associated with traditional integrated utilities.  Exactly how well ISOs and 
RTOs have executed these tasks, and at what costs, are important, and controversial, issues. 
 Simultaneous with and supportive of these reforms, many states sought to have the 
traditional utilities within their jurisdictions divest their generation plant and thus become pure or 
nearly-pure distribution utilities.  Such divestiture, it was believed, would help create broader and 
deeper markets for wholesale power.  Divestiture occurred in a variety of different manners.  In 
states such as New Hampshire and Connecticut, state laws or orders of the public utility 
commissions simply mandated divestiture.  An alternative scenario involved utilities being 
coaxed into divestitures in trade for regulatory approval of other measures they sought, for 
example, permission to merge, recovery of stranded costs, or adoption of incentive regulation to 
replace cost of service.  For example, AEP’s proposal to acquire Central and SouthWest Corp. 
was approved only on the condition that the parties divest more than 1000 MW of generation 
capacity in Texas.  Finally, in some states such as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland, 
utilities undertook divestiture apparently by themselves.  Whether this was truly voluntary is open 
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 to debate, since little happened during these years that was not conditioned by actual or 
prospective regulatory action. 
 The resulting shift of generation assets was truly massive.  Between 1992 and 2000, some 
300 plants constituting 22 percent of all generation capacity in the U.S. had been sold or 
transferred to non-utility subsidiaries of investor-owned utilities (EIA, 2000).  That percentage 
had been expected to double in the following decade, although subsequent problems in California 
and other markets that had undergone restructuring fueled doubts about further reforms.  
Mirroring the emergence of standalone generation, of course, has been the creation of a 
substantial number of new distribution utilities.  While pure distribution utilities had previously 
existed, the vast majority of those were publicly owned utilities or rural electric coops.  The new 
distribution utilities are investor-owned and profit-oriented.  They usually are in name, personnel, 
and operations continuations of the vertically integrated utilities from which they sprang. 
 It should be noted, however, that a significant number of investor-owned utilities 
remained vertically integrated to some considerable degree throughout this period of active 
restructuring.  This was due to the fact that some operated in regions less committed to a policy of 
deintegration, while others simply resisted state and federal pressures.  Those utilities’ 
experiences provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of those utilities undergoing 
divestiture. 
 Our focus will be on the effects of major divestitures on the efficiency of standalone 
distribution utilities.  The reasons that divestiture might affect distribution efficiency follow from 
the arguments concerning vertical integration, of which divestiture is a uniquely large and 
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 involuntary example.2  In principle, vertically integrated utilities might benefit from economies of 
at least three classic sorts.3  First, there may be interdependencies between stages of production in 
the form of coordination of scheduled shutdowns, joint optimization of generation and 
transmission investment, and better information flows between stages for real-time operation, 
among others.  Second, these advantages may be reinforced by transactional economies resulting 
from contractual incompleteness, asset specificity, and opportunistic behavior.  Third, vertically 
integrated firms may avoid double marginalization, as firms with pricing discretion at each stage 
engage in successive mark-ups (although this effect may be attenuated by regulation). 
 On the other hand, deintegration and divestiture may also have some efficiency benefits.   
After shedding generation plant, deintegrated utilities remain only in the distribution business.  
Since this becomes their only source of income, they may focus more intensively on it and 
perform more efficiently than before.  In addition, to the extent that certain aspects of their 
distribution business may be subject to some retail competition, competitive forces may drive 
them to achieve greater efficiency after divestiture.  And finally, it is possible that vertical 
integration is simply a neutral factor, creating neither benefits or costs. 
 These conflicting tendencies of vertical integration have been subject to empirical test in 
electricity.  Studies by Henderson (1985) and Hayashi (1997), for example, estimate cost 
                                                 
 2 A search for literature on the effects of divestitures in general produced surprisingly 
little, most of which involved the rather special case of the AT&T divestiture.  See, for example, 
Chen and Melville (1986) and Cho and Cohen (1997).  Much of the rest of what exists can be 
found in Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987). 
 3 For a standard discussion of such vertical economies, see Church and Ware (2000), ch. 
22. 
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 functions that permit testing for the mathematical separability of generation from the transmission 
and distribution stages.  Both reject separability, indicating likely vertical economies.  Closely 
related to this are studies by Gilsdorf (1994) and by Lee (1995) examining cost complementarity 
between generation, transmission, and distribution.  These reject cost complementarity, although 
that condition is sufficient but not necessary for economies of scope or vertical economies.  Tests 
for overall vertical economies strengthen these findings.  Kaserman and Mayo (1991) and Kwoka 
(2002) estimate multi-stage cost functions which allow for direct tests of overall vertical 
economies, finding significant economies between the generation and transmission/distribution 
stages for all but the smallest utilities.4   
 In a study with some similarities to our own, Delmas and Tokat (2005) report that a 
greater degree of integration by electric utilities is associated with higher efficiency, as measured 
by data envelopment analysis, whereas a separate variable for divestiture is associated with lower 
efficiency.  Both variables, however, are defined in ways that obscure interpretation.5  Mansur’s 
                                                 
 4 Two recent international studies deserve note as well.  Nemoto and Goto (2004) test the 
technological externality effects of generation assets on the costs of transmission and distribution 
stages in their study of vertically integrated Japanese utilities.  Their results show that 
downstream costs depend on the generation capital, suggesting significant economies of vertical 
integration.   Fraquelli et al (2005) analysis of Italian municipal electric utilities finds significant 
vertical economies for average-size and large utilities while failing to find any significant effects 
for smaller than average-size utilities.  Efficiencies associated with vertical integration are largest 
for fully integrated utilities, confirming results found in most other studies.  See also the survey 
by Michaels (2006). 
 5 They find that a high degree of integration is associated with greatest efficiency, but they 
also report a U-shaped relationship through the range of vertical integration.  The latter seems 
likely an artifact of their use of a demeaned measure of vertical integration, together with positive 
coefficients on both the linear and quadratic terms for the degree of integration.  Also problematic 
is their measure of divestiture, which is defined as 0 if there is no deregulation of any kind, 1 if 
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 study (2007) of PJM utilities concludes that vertical integration results in greater control of 
upstream market power, while divestiture permits generators in some markets to lower output and 
extract excess profit.  Similar concerns over market power in a deintegrated setting underlies 
findings in Bushnell et al (2008) 
 These results concerning vertical economies provide a context in which to view 
previously-noted studies suggesting efficiency benefits from divestiture on the generation stage.  
Bushnell and 
   
Wolfram (2005) report improvements in fuel efficiency of about two percent for those generating 
units that underwent divestiture to non-utility ownership.  Notably, however, gains of essentially 
the same magnitude also resulted from incentive regulation of non-divested units, leading the 
authors to conclude that incentives rather than  ownership changes were responsible for 
performance improvements.  The Fabrizio et al study (2007) finds that labor and non-fuel 
expenses–but not fuel expenses--for generating plants in restructuring markets fell by about three 
to five percent.  Interestingly, this improvement took place before divestiture, a fact which they 
interpret as indicating anticipatory action by the utility.  
 While this evidence is not entirely unambiguous, it does suggest that divestiture may well 
improve generator efficiency but that overall diseconomies attend vertical deintegration.  
Together these findings imply that offsetting losses must arise elsewhere in the vertical chain.  
                                                                                                                                                               
there is deregulation, and 2 if there is deregulation plus divestiture.  This scaling does not 
distinguish the effect of simple deregulation but without divestiture (the change in value from 0 to 
1) from that divestiture (the change from 2 to 1–or perhaps from 2 to 0).  Moreover, these are 
state-level variables and may therefore not capture the status of all utilities in the jurisdiction. 
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 The present study can be viewed as an effort to determine whether such diseconomies manifest 
themselves at the distribution stage and, if so, whether they might outweigh any gains within 
generation.  These questions in turn serve as the foundation for evaluating divestiture policy in the 
electricity sector. 
  
III.  DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND MODEL 
 This section begins with a discussion of the data used in this study.  It then describes the 
two-step process of analysis, first using data envelopment analysis to measure efficiency, and then 
regression analysis to test for causal relationships affecting efficiency.  We take these up in turn. 
A.  DATA 
 The data base used in this study consists of 73 distribution utilities, all subsidiaries of the 
major U.S. investor owned utilities for the period 1994-2003.  We have some information on a 
total of 305 such utilities, but several considerations reduce the number of usable observations.  
Some are generators, which are not the focus of this study and hence are excluded.  Also excluded 
are a number of observations involving non-responses or unresolvable data inconsistencies, 
typically involving relatively small utilities.  Finally, we seek a balanced panel and thus do not 
use  observations that do not represent a continuous series.  Nonetheless, the utilities that are 
included in our data base account for well over half of total MWH of distribution in each year (for 
example, 57% for the typical year 2000).   
 For each such utility we have comprehensive data on its finances and operations derived 
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 from FERC Form 1 filings,6 together with supplementary information extracted from Electrical 
World Directory of Electric Utilities.  These include total sales, residential sales, total customers, 
residential customers, distribution line length, total distribution costs, total administrative costs, 
and customer service costs.  Definitions of variables used at each stage are discussed below.  
These data have distinctive strengths.  Since distribution has been relatively unchanged in 
function, and since these utilities have had unchanged FERC reporting requirements, the data 
represent a consistent basis for measuring performance at the level of the individual operating unit 
before and after deintegration or divestiture.  By contrast, generation now involves numerous 
independent suppliers that are not required to report on their operations and finances, while 
transmission is notoriously difficult to compare and assess.  Our data avoid these problems. 
  One major complication is that by the end of 2003 approximately 20 states had partially 
deregulated their retail markets, so that customers could choose their suppliers.  In those states the 
traditional distribution utility performed only the local transport function, rather than transport 
and product supply, although most served as default suppliers as well.  This arrangement affects 
the local distribution utilities’ reported customer numbers, output, and costs, which are recorded 
separately for bundled and unbundled services.  Consistent records for each affected utility in the 
sample were reconstructed from data from a different utility report–namely, Form 861--with 
additional information as necessary from direct contacts with state utility commission staff. 
 For the 73 utilities in the data base, our focus is on major policy-induced divestitures.  
                                                 
 6 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form No. 1 is a comprehensive financial and 
operating report submitted annually by all investor-owned utilities.  We employ a version 
processed by Platts. 
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 Defining a “major divestiture” and identifying the year in which it occurred are important 
threshold issues since the extent of generation plant owned and the degree of vertical integration 
vary to modest degrees in many years.  These routine variations need to be distinguished from the 
major policy divestitures that constitute our focus.  Our methodology involved detailed 
examination of the actual divestitures undertaken by each of the utilities in the data base.  State 
PUC records, primarily on commission websites, constituted the primary source of information, 
although in a number of cases telephone contact with PUC personnel was required for 
clarification or confirmation.  Based on this examination, we define a major divestiture as a year-
to-year decline in a utility’s generation plant of at least one-half its initial amount, where that 
initial amount had to represent a substantial fraction of its requirements.7  In some cases 
divestitures occurred over a period in excess of a single year, in which case the divestiture was 
associated with the initial year.8
 From this process, we establish that 28 of the 73 firms in the data base underwent a major 
divestiture during the sample period, while 45 of them did not.  As shown in Table 1, these major 
divestitures resulted in a decline from 69.1 percent to 18.8 percent in the proportion of electricity 
requirements that these utilities self-supplied.  This fraction–a measure of the extent of  vertical 
integration–makes clear that these utilities were transformed from largely integrated to 
                                                 
 7 This latter criterion is intended to exclude, for example, a utility whose generation plant 
declined from 5 percent of its requirements to 2 percent–a greater-than-one-half decline that 
nonetheless does not constitute a major divestiture.  What constituted a substantial decline and 
therefore a major divestiture was in all cases clear from the data. 
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 substantially deintegrated in a very few years.  By contrast, the degree of deintegration by non-
divesting utilities declined only modestly–from 70.0 percent to 61.3 percent--during the study 
period.  Figure 1 shows the precipitous nature of the decline in the degree of integration for all 73 
utilities, for those that divested, and for those that did not. 
 We are interested in comparing the efficiency of divesting utilities with that of comparable 
non-divesting utilities.  We also distinguish the experience of utilities for which divestiture was 
mandated by the state public utility commission or legislative action, versus those undertaken at 
the utility’s own discretion or at most involving a quid pro quo.  This distinction was made based 
on analyses of the public utilities commission records and in some instances direct inquiry to the 
PUC.  Of the 28 divesting utilities, eight involved mandatory divestitures, the remaining twenty 
non-mandatory.  Data for utilities in these categories are also reported in Table 1. 
B   DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS 
 The analytical methodology used in this study is data envelopment analysis (Coelli et al, 
1998).  DEA uses observed inputs and outputs of decision making units (DMUs) or firms in the 
sample to construct a best practice frontier.  Operation of each actual firm is then compared to a 
linear combination of best practice firms which can produce the same amount of output as the 
firm in question, but generally with lesser amount of inputs.  Figure 2 illustrates relationship 
between firm 1's input utilization relative to best practice production of output amount X, the 
latter defined by DMUs labeled 2 and 3 and 4.  The radial distance from the best practice frontier 
                                                                                                                                                               
 8 That is, if generation plant went from 40 to 20 percent in the first year, and then 20 to 10 
percent, the year of the first reduction was taken as the major divestiture.  Controls for the second 
year in such cases made little difference in the results. 
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 to any non-frontier firm 1's input usage measures the technical inefficiency for firm 1.  
Specifically, the ratio OD/OR measures the relative efficiency for all firms outside the frontier, 
with a “1" denoting a best practice firm and “0" the lowest efficiency score possible (although no 
actual utility approached this lower bound). 
 Mathematically, the efficiency scores are calculated by solving linear programs9 of the 
form shown in Equation (1) below.  Assuming that the firm uses K inputs and M outputs, X and Y 
represent K Η N input and M Η N output matrices, respectively.  The input and output column 
vectors for the ith firm are represented by xi and yi, respectively, and 8 represents an N Η1 vector 
of constants.  Then for the ith firm in a sample of N firms, the program solves for a scalar 2 that 
equals the efficiency score, as follows: 
  min 2,8 2  s.t.        (1) 
   - yi + Y 8 >_ 0 
   2 xi,D - XD 8 _> 0   
   8 >_ 0 
This optimization is solved once for each firm to calculate the efficiency of the firm with respect 
to all other firms in the sample.  The DEA scores calculated in this manner represent technical 
efficiency.10   
 Relative to other techniques for measuring efficiency, DEA has several advantages 
                                                 
 9 This discussion of the linear program draws from Hattori et al (2005). 
 10 Cost as well as allocative inefficiency require input prices, beyond the scope of the 
present inquiry. 
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 (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). It is non-parametric, so that it avoids the need to choose the functional 
form.  It handles multiple outputs quite readily, a useful capability in the present context.  And it 
allows for a straightforward calculation of technical efficiency.  Alternative techniques such as 
corrected ordinary least squares and stochastic frontier analysis also have their distinctive merits, 
but in comparing the performance of these three techniques, Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) find that 
results are highly correlated.  We therefore take advantage of DEA, with the expectation that 
other techniques would show similar results. 
 Application of data envelopment analysis requires two additional choices–input vs. output 
orientation, and constant vs. variable returns to scale.  We employ what is termed input oriented 
DEA in order to measure the efficiency of firm operation in minimizing inputs to produce a given 
level of output.  This is more suitable to the nature of distribution utilities that meet largely 
exogenous demand, than would be output oriented DEA which measures the efficiency of firms in 
maximizing outputs from a given level of inputs.  Also, we assume constant returns to scale in the 
belief that units undergoing divestitures or other structural changes are making precisely the kinds 
of decisions that ensure they remain at optimum scale.  Moreover, many of these distribution 
utilities are subsidiaries of holding companies that help ensure realization of any scale economies 
not readily achieved at the unit level.  Finally, the variable returns to scale assumption compares 
each firm to different best practice firms, tending thereby to attribute any efficiency differences to 
scale differences and obscuring underlying relative performance. 
 Our DEA model specifies three output variables–MWH sales, number of customers, and 
distribution network length.   Each of these represents a cost-causal feature of distribution utility 
operations:  Costs rise with output, but they also rise with the number of customers to whom that 
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 output is delivered and sold,11 and with a greater number of distribution miles over which that 
output is supplied.  These factors have been found to be important in previous empirical studies in 
the literature (e.g., Jamasb and Pollitt (2001); Kwoka (2006)).  Two alternative input measures are 
employed–one for short-run variable costs, the other capturing longer-run cost considerations.  
Both use a single variable–the value of input cost--as the relevant measure, thus aggregating fuel, 
labor, materials, and (in the case of long run costs) capital expenses.  This aggregation is 
appropriate so long as input tradeoffs are weak, as they surely are between fuel and labor costs, 
fuel and materials costs, and labor and materials costs (Jamasb and Pollitt (2003)).  On this 
assumption, such measures have been found to be a sound basis for comparison of real resource 
usage. 
 The short-run variable cost OPEX measure consists of total non-capital costs of 
distribution, defined as the sum of distribution costs, plus customer service costs, plus a prorated 
share of total administration costs.  The prorating factor is the ratio of wages in distribution plus 
service, to total wages in operations and maintenance.12  Longer run costs should include some 
measure of capital costs.  The most obvious measure–imputed capital costs–has a number of 
significant deficiencies in the present context.  It is sensitive to assumptions concerning capital 
valuation and rate of return.  In electricity, imputed costs can be so large as to dwarf operating 
expenses, making their sensitivity to assumptions a potentially serious flaw.  And perhaps most 
importantly for our purposes, since distribution capital–wires, etc.--is so long-lived, it can 
                                                 
 11 We use the number of residential customers, which account for the vast majority of total 
customers. 
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 scarcely be altered by a utility in the relevant period of time. 
 Accordingly, we take as a measure of long-run costs the sum of operating costs plus the 
utility’s current capital expenditures.  The use of current capital expenditures has two advantages 
as a measure of relevant costs:  It is indisputably a controllable expenditure in the relevant time 
frame, and it is clearly related to the capital investment program of the utility.  Of course, current 
capital decisions are influenced by factors other than efficiency, including such things as market 
conditions, investment opportunities, and strategic decisions.  For all these reasons, the results on 
total controllable costs TCEX, while illuminating, should be interpreted with caution. 
C.  REGRESSION MODEL 
 The second step involves the regression analysis of the computed DEA scores for 1994-
2003, to test for the impact on distribution utilities of major divestitures of their generation plant.  
Our dependent variable is the DEA-based efficiency score ranging from 0 to 1.  The independent 
variables of interest include a variable for the post-divestiture years for those utilities that 
underwent major divestiture during this period.  These results compare divesting utilities’ post-
divestiture experience to the control group that underwent no major divestitures.  Alternative 
specifications of two kinds follow.  The first includes two variables for divesting utilities, one for 
those that underwent mandated divestitures and a second for divestitures that were not mandated.  
The former are less likely to represent utilities’ own preferences and perceived self-interests and 
thus more likely to sacrifice efficiency of performance.  The second variation introduces a set of 
post-divestiture year dummies, instead of a single post-divestiture variable, in order to test for  
                                                                                                                                                               
 12 For a similar approach, see Jamasb and Pollitt (2003). 
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 time-dependent effects from divestiture.  Other models examine separate subsets of the data for 
each type of divestiture.  Finally, the regression controls for the ratio of residential sales to total 
sales, denoted RES-PCT, since the provision of residential sales is particularly costly due to 
additional infrastructure and service requirements.  We shall discuss the definitions of these 
variables as they arise in particular regression models. 
 The structure of our data and our model raise some issues of the appropriate estimation 
technique.  We note in particular that DEA scores are censored at 1, a characteristic that might 
suggest use of tobit analysis.  In the present case, however, this censoring is not a constraint on 
the observed outcomes of a behavioral relationship that might logically produce values in excess 
of 1, for example, excess demand for a good or service which is not observed due to fixed supply.   
Rather, the upper bound of 1 is the result of the fact that DEA scores are definitionally bounded at 
0 and 1.  Since this is not the data generating process that underlies tobit, that technique is neither 
necessary nor appropriate.  Moreover, none of the observations involving the divesting firms that 
are our primary focus involve values of 1.  
 Accordingly, the regression analysis proceeds using GLS estimation with fixed effects.  
Fixed effects control for any unobserved differences among the utilities, thus helping to ensure 
that the reported results are not simply reflecting such other characteristics.  Results using random 
effects, arguably useful given the fact that our sample does not include many utilities,13 are not 
substantially different and are available upon request. 
 
                                                 
 13 For discussion, see Greene 1993), pp 469-471. 
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 IV.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 We begin by examining the effects of major divestitures of generation on short-run 
operating efficiency of distribution utilities, and then turn to longer run efficiency as measured by 
controllable costs.  In each case we examine alternative specifications and subsets of the data in 
order to determine the importance of the type of divestiture and the time path of effects.  
A.  OPERATING EFFICIENCY AND DIVESTITURE TYPE AND TIMING 
 The initial cut into the data is simply a regression of DEA scores of operating efficiency 
OPEX on two variables–the dummy variable POST-DIVEST that takes on a value of one for each 
post-divestiture year for the 28 utilities that experienced a major divestiture, and a variable for the 
percent residential sales of the utility (RES-PCT).  The results of estimating this model are given 
in Table 2, Column (a).  With respect to RES-PCT, we note that here and in most results, this 
variable behaves predictably:  DEA-measured efficiency is lower for utilities whose customer 
base is more heavily residential.  Hence, we will not discuss this variable further.14  In this most 
general form, the coefficient on POST-DIVEST is negative but lacks statistical significance (t= 
.67).  This result obviously does not suggest an important effect of divestiture, although the next 
two specifications reveal more of the actual effects.  . 
 The specification in column (b) replaces the variable POST-DIVEST for all divesting 
utilities with two variables.  POST-MAND is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for 
the post-divestiture years of those eight utilities whose divestiture was mandated, while the 
dummy variable POST-NON is the analogous dummy variable for the twenty utilities that 
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 divested but not under a mandate to do so.  A clear difference now emerges in the post-divestiture 
efficiency experience of these types of divestiture.  Mandated divestitures are associated with a 
.029 point drop in efficiency relative to the base group of non-divesting utilities, whereas non-
mandated divestitures had essentially no effect on measured efficiency scores.  Despite the 
uncertain statistical significance of POST-MAND, this does indicate some negative effect from 
divestiture policy for the subset of utilities that had divestiture forced upon them by state action.  
The estimated effect of -.029 points represents about four percent of the overall average DEA 
efficiency in the data base of .69.  In contrast, divestitures that were strictly voluntary or involved 
some quid pro quo exhibit no real difference from the control group of non-divesting utilities.  
The coefficient on POST-NON is .001 with a t-statistic of .09. 
 A further variation on the initial specification takes into account the fact that divestiture 
policy, like many others, is unlikely to have its full effect immediately.  Accordingly, we define a 
series of timing dummies POST1, POST2, ...POST6 for successive years after the particular 
utility’s major divestiture.  POST1 equals one for the first year after divestiture, POST2 for the 
second year, and so forth.  These variables effectively disaggregate the single variable POST-
DIVEST in the earlier model.  Column (c) reports the results of this estimation.   
 While none of the estimated coefficients achieves statistical significance, the results 
suggest that timing may well matter.  Initially efficiency appears essentially unchanged, as 
indicated by the small and insignificant coefficient on POST1.  This is probably due to the fact 
that the very first year is a transition period in which both operations and accounting reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                               
 14 Elimination of this control variable does not affect the results in any substantial way.  
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 utility’s immediate past history.  Beginning with the second post-divestiture year, however, 
suggestions of possible effects of divestiture emerge.  Measured efficiency in that second year is 
.015 lower than prior to divestiture, with subsequent years .022, .005, and .027 lower.  The year-
six results indicate an efficiency improvement, but this result is based on exactly two data points 
where POST6 equals one.  Since this is likely a small numbers quirk rather than a meaningful 
substantive phenomenon, we do not focus on this result here or in later results. 
 The results in column (b) and those in column (c) reinforce the conviction that divestiture 
type and timing matter.  This becomes yet more apparent in the results in Table 3, which splits the 
sample into utilities that divested under a mandate, versus those that divested but not as a result of 
a mandate.15  Their efficiency performance is now starkly and significantly different.  Column (a) 
re-estimates the model in the last column of the preceding table, which utilized the dummy 
variables POST1, ...POST6 to capture the time path of divestiture effects on efficiency.  For these 
utilities that divested under mandate, after the transition year POST1, their measured efficiency 
declines precipitously–by .160 points in year 2, followed by .125 points, .243 points, and .244 
points.  All of these estimates are statistically significant, with t-values no less that 2.80.  Quite 
clearly, mandated divestitures have adversely affected utilities’ operating efficiency. 
 Column (b) respecifies the previous model in a manner intended to summarize the post-
divestiture experience of utilities undergoing mandatory divestiture.  Specifically, we define 
POST26 as a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for the second through sixth post-divestiture 
                                                                                                                                                               
Nor does the inclusion of other possible controls. 
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 year.16  Together with POST1 (held separate based on past results), this model is estimated and 
the results reported in column (b).  As before, POST1 is insignificant both in magnitude and 
statistical reliability.  POST26, however, is highly significant, and its magnitude implies that 
across all post-divestiture years starting with year 2, measured efficiency of distribution utilities 
falls by .148 points, or about twenty percent, as a result of mandatory divestitures. 
 As might be expected from previous results, the post-divestiture efficiency experience of 
non-mandated divestitures is quite different.  Column (c) of Table 3 reports the results of 
estimating a model analogous to that in column (a) for mandatory divestitures, but in contrast to 
those results, the estimated coefficients on POST1, ...POST517 are all small, positive-valued, and 
statistically insignificant.  It seems clear that where utilities choose to divest or are willing to do 
so as part of a larger bargain with the regulatory agency, their efficiency experience was quite 
different–not necessarily positive, but certainly avoiding the sharp declines experienced by 
mandated divestitures.  
 For symmetry with the column (b) specification, column (d) aggregates all the post-
divestiture effects (including in this case that in the first year) into the single variable POST15.  
Given column (c) results, it is not surprising that the estimated coefficient on POST15 is small, 
                                                                                                                                                               
 15 Splitting the sample examines the effects of divestiture on each sample separately, given 
that such divestiture has occurred to those utilities.  This avoids possibly biased estimates from 
any endogeneity.  
 16 Since POST6 is based on exactly two observations, it should not be interpreted as truly 
indicative of a sixth year effect.  We nonetheless include it in POST26.  
 17 The only two observations on POST6 are for mandated divestitures, so that variable 
drops out of this regression on non-mandatory divestitures. 
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 positive, and statistically insignificant.  The operating efficiency of utilities undergoing non-
mandatory divestitures is essentially unchanged by that divestiture.  Their efficiency is little 
different after divestiture versus before–but quite different from that of utilities undergoing 
mandated divestiture. 
 Overall, we conclude that divestiture has a substantial adverse effect on the operating 
efficiency of utilities that were required to divest their generation assets.  This adverse effect does  
not arise in the case of non-mandatory divestitures.  We next turn to the issue of the effects of 
these same divestitures on total controllable costs. 
B.  TOTAL CONTROLLABLE COSTS AND DIVESTITURE TYPE AND TIMING 
 As discussed previously, total controllable costs are a broader measure of utility efficiency 
than operating expenses insofar as they include current capital expenditures to represent 
discretionary capital costs.  Data envelopment analysis of total controllable costs TCEX generates 
a set of efficiency scores for all 73 utilities for the years 1994-2003, much as for OPEX.  This 
section reports the results of  regression analyses of those scores. 
 Regression analysis of TCEX scores utilizes the same model specifications and estimation 
method as in the case of OPEX.  The results largely track the findings of the earlier analysis, as 
well.  Table 4 examines the full sample of utilities, while Table 5 splits the sample into utilities 
that underwent mandatory divestitures vs. those with non-mandatory divestitures.  Column (a) of 
Table 4 estimates the sparest model, with just POST-DIVEST and the control variable PCT-RES 
as explanatory variables.  There is no indication from  the estimated coefficient on POST-DIVEST 
that divestitures overall altered the efficiency of utilities, as measured by TCEX.   
 That conclusion is subject to revision based on column (b) results.  This specification finds 
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 significantly lower efficiency scores for utilities undergoing mandatory divestitures (POST-
MAND) but no significant effect–albeit a slightly positive coefficient--for those which undertook 
divestiture largely at their own initiative (POST-NON).  As with OPEX, it seems clear that 
mandated divestitures represent structural changes that are not in the interests of the affected 
distribution utilities.  The final set of results in this table, in column (c), reports on the efficiency 
effects of  divestitures on a year-by-year basis.  The results are broadly similar, though weaker, 
than those found for OPEX.  POST1, the variable for the first post-divestiture year, has a positive 
but insignificant coefficient, followed by a series of year dummies with negative coefficients.  
Only one of the latter approaches statistical significance, so as with OPEX, there is only modest 
indication of time-dependent effects for divesting utilities. 
 Table 5 disaggregates those utilities into those for which divestiture was mandated vs. 
those that divested largely at their own discretion.  The model in column (a) estimates the year-
by-year model for mandatory divestitures.  Apart from the first year after divestiture, which again 
has a weakly positive coefficient, efficiency is lower in all years from the second through the 
sixth after divestiture.  Four of those five estimated yearly effects are significant or nearly so, with 
magnitudes in the range of .119 through .182.  As with OPEX, mandated divestitures have 
adverse effects on distribution utilities.  This result is corroborated in column (b), which combines 
POST2 through POST6 into a single summary variable for those years.  POST26 emerges with a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of .109, leaving little doubt about the reduction in 
efficiency following such divestitures. 
 Non-mandated divestitures are examined in columns (c) and (d) of Table 5.  Since there is 
little evidence of effect–either positive or negative–from such divestitures in the preceding table, 
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 or for that matter with respect to OPEX, a reasonable expectation here would again be for little if 
any effect.  Indeed, that is the case.  Column (c) indicates a negative but generally small and 
insignificant effect of non-mandatory divestitures on a year-by-year basis.  Only one year dummy 
out of five–specifically, POST3--carries a t-value in excess of one.  Column (d) reports the results 
of combining these five year dummies into a single post-divestiture variable POST15.  While the 
coefficient is negative, its t-value is only .73, leading again to the conclusion that non-mandated 
divestitures do not have a clear effect on utility performance. 
 In summary, we conclude that with respect to our measure of overall costs, the results are 
quite similar to those for operating costs only.  Specifically, divestitures that were mandated by 
state regulatory authorities after the first year reduce utility efficiency by a substantial amount and 
for a significant period of time.  In contrast, divestitures undertaken largely at the utilities’ own 
initiative are not associated with such adverse effects. 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The large number of divestitures in a relatively short period of time is nearly 
unprecedented in any single industry.  In the U.S. electricity sector, these divestitures were largely 
the result of public policy that sought to foster competition among independent generators.  
Considerably less attention was paid to the possible effects of this policy on the simultaneously 
created standalone distribution utilities.  This study represents the first evaluation of the latter 
sector in light of divestiture policy.   
 We have found that divestitures mandated by state regulatory authorities had adverse 
effects on efficiency, measured both by operating costs and also by total costs including capital 
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 expenditures.  These effects have been both large and significant, casting considerable doubt on 
the policy of forced divestiture.  Notably, however, utilities that undertook divestitures that were 
not the result of mandate did not experience any adverse effects on their efficiency. 
 These results raise questions about the merits of a centerpiece of electricity restructuring 
namely, mandated divestitures in order to create standalone generation sector.  The resulting 
standalone distribution utilities appear to suffer from significant and persistent reduced efficiency.  
Taken by itself, this represents a cost of divestiture policy, but it also raises a question about the 
overall benefits of the policy.  Whatever the benefits at the generation stage, these must be 
weighed against the costs to distribution utilities in order to arrive at a comprehensive judgment 
about divestiture policy as a whole.  That judgment is not rendered here, but is certainly a subject 
that needs to be on the policy agenda. 
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      TABLE 1 
All Utilities in the Sample 
       
       
     Degree of Vertical Integration 
Category  Number  
Mean Total 
Sales (M MWh) 1994 2003 
      
All  73  22,200 0.696 0.450 
Non-Divesting  45  19,900 0.700 0.613 
Divesting  28  25,900 0.691 0.188 
     Mandatory  8  17,200 0.621 0.288 
     Non-
mandatory 
 
20  29,300 0.719 0.148 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Analysis on OPEX: Full Sample 
  (a) (b) (c)  
   
 POST-DIVEST -.008    
  (.67)    
     
 POST-MAND  -.029   
  (1.45)   
     
 POST-NON  .001   
  (.09)   
     
 POST1   .001  
   (.08)  
     
 POST2   -.015  
   (.82)  
     
 POST3   -.022  
   (1.05)  
     
 POST4   -.005  
   (.22)  
     
 POST5   -.027  
   (.85)  
     
 POST6   .150  
   (2.47)  
     
 RES-PCT -.198 -.209 -.187  
  (2.56) (2.69) (2.37)  
      
 CONSTANT .740 .743 .737  
  (32.0) (32.0) (31.2)  
      
 R2 .031 .030 .037  
 F 8.15 7.63 6.20  
 N 730 730 730  
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TABLE 3 
Regression Analysis on OPEX: Split Samples 
       
  Mandatory  Non-Mandatory
  (a) (b)  ( c) (d) 
       
 POST1 .014 .016  .017  
  (.44) (.53)  (.66)  
       
 POST2 -.160   .026  
  (4.93)   (.89)  
       
 POST3 -.125   .051  
  (2.80)   (1.51)  
       
 POST4 -.243   .067  
  (5.38)   (1.66)  
       
 POST5 -.244   .086  
  (3.79)   (1.63  
       
 POST6 -.206     
  (3.07)     
       
 POST26  -.148    
   (4.92)    
       
 POST15     .023 
      (1.01) 
       
 RES-PCT -.698 -.553  .236 .153 
  (3.68) (2.98)  (1.51) (1.03) 
       
 CONSTANT .829 .792  .581 .603 
  (15.9) (15.3)  (12.8) (13.9) 
       
 R2 .080 .347  .050 .059 
 F 7.98 8.50  1.92 2.38 
 N 80 80  200 200 
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TABLE 4 
Regression Analysis on TCEX: Full Sample 
 (a) (b) (c) 
POST-DIVEST -.003   
 (.22)   
    
POST-MAND  -.055  
  (2.16)  
    
POST-NON  .020  
  (1.10)  
    
POST1   .018 
   (.84) 
    
POST2   -.004 
   (.18) 
    
POST3   -.042 
   (1.57) 
    
POST4   -.004 
   (.13) 
    
POST5   -.036 
   (.88) 
    
POST6   .100 
   (1.30) 
    
RES-PCT -.150 -.178 -.162 
 (1.53) (1.82) (1.61) 
    
CONSTANT .784 .792 .787 
 (26.8) (27.0) (26.3) 
    
R2 .084 .079 .092 
F 12.2 11.8 8.83 
N 730 730 730 
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TABLE 5 
Regression Analysis on TCEX: Split Samples 
 
   Mandatory  Non-Mandatory 
   (a) (b)  ( c) (d) 
       
 POST1 .055 .023  -.015  
   (1.32) (.62)  (.42)  
        
 POST2 -.146   -.017  
   (3.52)   (.41)  
        
 POST3 -.014   -.078  
   (.25)   (1.59)  
        
 POST4 -.182   -.033  
   (3.16)   (.57)  
        
 POST5 -.130   -.063  
   (1.58)   (.82)  
        
 POST6 -.119     
   (1.40)     
        
 POST26  -.109    
    (2.89)    
        
 POST15      -.024 
        (.73) 
        
 PCT REG -.807 -.754  .220 .276 
   (3.33) (3.25)  (.97) (1.29) 
        
 CONSTANT 1.01 .992  .653 .638 
   (15.1) (15.3)  (9.94) (10.2) 
        
 R2 .429 .400  .064 .071 
 F 6.63 7.40  2.50 3.22 
 N 80 80  200 200 
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